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We present a novel one-way quantum key distribution protocol based on 3-dimensional quantum
state, a qutrit, that encodes two qubits in its 2-dimensional subspaces. The qubits hold the classical
bit information that has to be shared between the legitimate users. Alice sends such a qutrit to Bob
where he decodes one of the qubit and measures it along the random Pauli basis. This scheme has
higher secure key rate at longer transmission distance than the standard BB84 protocol.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two legiti-
mate users, namely Alice and Bob, to share secure key
for cryptographic purpose. The security of the shared
key is guaranteed by the laws of quantum physics. Be-
sides its unconditional security, a promising QKD pro-
tocol needs to meet higher key generation rate as well
as longer transmission distance. Since its first proposal
in 1984 the protocol BB84 [1] has been scrutinized and
proven secure under a vast range of eavesdropping strate-
gies [2–6]. There are also other protocols [7–10], merited
by their own account, that enhance the secure key gen-
eration rate and transmission distance beyond the BB84
protocol.
However, efforts are also made on BB84 protocol for
increasing its throughput. For example, decoy state
BB84 [8] increases the transmission distance by secur-
ing it against the photon number splitting (PNS) attack.
Using integrated optics based on planar lightwave cir-
cuit technology [11] increases the key generation rate of
BB84 protocol implemented with time-bin qubits. Along
in this direction, we propose a one-way scheme that uti-
lizes 3-dimensional quantum state, a qutrit, for perform-
ing QKD. Performance of qutrit based protocols have
been studied before in [12–15]. The main feature of our
scheme is that the qutrit encodes two BB84-qubits in
its 2-dimensional subspaces. By saying BB84-qubits we
address the qubits originally prepared along the random
Pauli basis for performing the protocol BB84. In order
to extract the classical bit information one has to first
decode the qubits from the qutrit and then measure it
along the correct basis.
The advantage of this scheme is that Eve, also Bob,
cannot decode the qubits with certainty. As a result,
eavesdropping strategies assisted with quantum mem-
ory [16] may not be fully effective for stealing complete
bit of information. This implies that the practical im-
plementation of our scheme using weak coherent source
can have comparatively higher mean photon number, µ,
and higher key rate at longer transmission distance than
the standard BB84 scheme. Additionally, using single
photon pulses may drain less information to Eve during
individual attacks [17] .
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FIG. 1: The scheme for qkd with qubits encoded in qutrit.
Alice encodes two BB84 qubits that span the Hilbert space
2Ha and
2Hb in a qutrit in
3H and sends to Bob. He decodes
one of the qubit from the qutrit with a probability p and mea-
sure the qubit along Pauli Z or X basis. With a probability
1− p he fails to decode the qubit and the protocol fails.
In the following, we will describe our scheme by featur-
ing its encoding and decoding procedure by adopting the
technique given in [18]. This will follow a comparison of
the performance of the proposed protocol with standard
BB84 protocol, while they are under collective attacks.
Let us start the description of our protocol, see Fig. 1,
by considering two qubit states |ψa〉, (|0〉a+eiϕa |1〉a)/
√
2
and |ψb〉 = (|0〉b + eiϕb |1〉b)/
√
2, that span the 2-
dimensional Hilbert spaces 2Ha and
2Hb, respectively.
The basis of the joint state |ψ〉 = |ψa〉 ⊗ |ψb〉 are labeled
as: |i〉a|j〉b → ||3j−i|〉. Let |φ〉 = (|0〉+|1〉+|2〉)/
√
3 be a
qutrit state in 3H. It is possible to encode the two qubits
in the qutrit by performing a projective measurement on
the joint state |φ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 using the projector
Π =
2∑
i=0
|i〉〈i| ⊗ |i〉〈i|. (1)
The resultant qutrit state, after the unitary operation
|i〉 ⊗ |j〉 → |i〉 ⊗ |j − i〉, is
|Φ〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉+ eiϕa |1〉+ ei(ϕa+ϕb)|2〉). (2)
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2By projecting the qutrit |Φ〉 onto a 2-dimensional sub-
space the encoded qubits can be retrieved with probabil-
ity 2/3. The respective projectors are:
Π1 = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1| and Π2 = |1〉〈1|+ |2〉〈2|. (3)
And the resultant qubit states are,
|ψ〉i = Πi|Φ〉√〈Φ|Πi|Φ〉 =
{
1√
2
(|0〉+ eiϕa |1〉) : i=1
1√
2
(|1〉+ eiϕb |2〉) : i=2 (4)
In the above equation global phases are ignored.
Now, consider Alice prepares two qubits in one of
the eigen states of Pauli Z and X operators, by ran-
domly choosing the value of ϕa and ϕb from the set
S = {0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 }. She then sends them to Bob one after
other where he measures them, randomly, along Pauli Z
or X basis. This is the standard BB84 protocol, execut-
ing twice for the distribution of secret key between the
legitimate users. Here, we would like to examine how
the qutrit state results from the encoding process can be
used for performing such a secret key distribution if Alice
would have prepared the initial qubits in eigen states of
Pauli Z and X operators. We call this scheme as ‘Qutrit’
QKD, hereafter. An experimental demonstration of en-
coding and decoding procedure is given in [19]. How-
ever, For the simplicity and thence practicality, we can
assume that a qutrit state prepared in Eq. (2) inherently
encodes qubits in its subspace. This assumption helps
Alice to starts the protocol straight from the qutrit |Φ〉
by obviating the encoding process. Alice chooses the val-
ues of ϕa and ϕb from the set S such that qubits, |ψa〉
and |ψb〉, in the subspaces are in Pauli eigen states. She
then sends the qutrit to Bob through a quantum chan-
nel. Upon receiving the qutrit, Bob randomly selects the
projectors Π1 or Π2 and decodes one of the qubits. He
then measures the qubit along the random Pauli Z or
X basis and registers the measurement outcome together
with the order (say, first or second) of the qubit. This
creates his raw key with probability 2/3. Bob fails to
decode the qubit with probability 1/3 and the protocol
fails. During key sifting process, Bob announces which
qubit he has decoded and on which basis he has measured
it. If the basis matches for the respective qubit then Al-
ice agrees to keep the key bit for further process such
as error correction and privacy amplification. Otherwise,
they discard it. This procedure exactly follows the clas-
sical part of BB84. Since our proposed qutrit protocol
shares many features of the BB84 protocol, we would like
to compare the performance of both of the protocols in
terms of the secure key rate.
For the practical reason we consider the protocols are
implemented using weak coherent source. Such a source
can easily be realized using only standard semiconduc-
tor laser and calibrated attenuators. The photon num-
ber statistics of a weak coherent source follows Pois-
son distribution. Therefore, the probability of finding
n photons in the quantum state generated by Alice is
P (n, µ) = µne−µ/n!, where µ is the mean photon number
per signal. Accordingly, with certain probability, a weak
coherent source emits signals that contain more than one
photon. Such multi-photon signals breach the security
of the QKD protocol because an eavesdropper gains par-
tial or complete information on the shared key without
revealing her presence to the legitimate users. Probabil-
ity of multi photon pulses can be made arbitrarily small
by choosing µ < 1. But very low value of µ results in
overall reduction in signal generation rate. Therefore,
there is a trade-off between the value of µ chosen by Alice
and secure key rate of the protocols, for each transmis-
sion distance. For example, at higher transmission dis-
tance, Eve may replace the lossy quantum channel with
a lossless channel and performs PNS attack on the multi-
photon pulses. She takes advantage on the attenuation
of the lossy channel by blocking as much as single pho-
ton pulses such that the total signal detected by bob
remains constant. Therefore, for transmission thorough
a lossy channel, value of µ must be chosen smaller than
that of an ideal lossless channel. We can see that the
proposed qutrit protocol allows Alice to choose compar-
atively higher µ than the BB84 protocol and that in turn
considerably enhance the key generation rate at higher
transmission distances.
In the following we compare the performance of the
BB84 and Qutrit protocols by quantifying the achiev-
able secret key rate K while considering the protocols
are under collective attacks [5]. During this attack, Eve
independently attacks each quantum signal sent by Al-
ice. She can store her ancillary states in quantum mem-
ory and wait for the classical post-processing and adopt
a best measurement strategy to extract the information.
Following an approach similar to that in [4] we will now
consider the security aspect of the protocol while they
are under collective attack. The secret key rate of a QKD
protocol can be defined as
K = PacceptPsiftRraw[1− h(Q)− IE)]. (5)
In the above equation, Paccept depends on the proto-
col implementation and is the probability that a detector
click contributes to the raw key, Psift = 1/2 accounts
for the fraction of raw key discarded due to wrong mea-
surement basis, Rraw = (Rsig + 2pd(1 − Rsig)) is the
raw key rate in which Rsig = 1 − e−µΓqΓbη ≈ µΓqΓbη
is the total detector clicks due to photons that survived
the attenuation Γq of the quantum channel and Γb of
Bob’s apparatus with detectors of average efficiency η
and dark count probability pd. The above approxima-
tion holds for the mean photon number per pulse µ < 1.
The channel attenuation related to transmission distance
l as Γq = 10
−αl/10, where α is the attenuation coefficient.
IE is the amount of information eavesdropped by Eve.
h(Q)is the amount of information leaked to Eve during
error correction procedure and h(.)is the Shannon en-
tropy. The qber Q is a function of µ and is defined as
Q = pd(1−Rsig)/Rraw +Qopt. (6)
3The first term in the above equation is the error rate
due to dark counts of Bob’s detectors. The constant
Qopt accounts for the errors from optical misalignment
of Bob’s apparatus. We attribute all sources of error to
Eve.
During collective attacks, Eve learns the number of
photon n present in the weak coherent pulse sent by Al-
ice and adopt a best attacking strategy that maximize
her information on the final secure key shared by the
users. On single photon pulses, Eve can gain informa-
tion at the expenses of introducing as error ε1. The
amount of information she obtains on single photon pulse
is IE,1 = h(ε1) [4]. For example, she can perform simple
intercept and resend attack that creates an error with
probability 1/4 and gain 1/2 a bit of information. For
multi-photon pulses, n ≥ 2, the optimal attack is PNS
attack during which Eve forwards one photon to Bob and
keeps the rest in her quantum memory. She makes no er-
ror and gain complete bit of information, i.e., εn≥2 = 0
and IE,n≥2 = 1. However, Eve learns zero information
while Alice sends vacuum pulse and Bob gets detection
event due to detector dark counts. Let us consider the
parameter Yn = Rn/Rraw be the probability that Bob
gets a sifted key from n-photon pulse sent by Alice with
probability PA(n) . Here, Rn = PsiftPA(n)fn and fn is
the probability that Eve forwards a single photon to Bob
for n-photon pulse. Eve can optimize the value of fn for
the total detection rate Rraw. The overall information
exposed to Eve is
IE = max [Y1h(ε1) + (1− Y0 − Y1)]
= 1−min {Y0 + Y1[1 + h(ε1)]} . (7)
In order to maximizing her information, Eve’s optimal
attack should be compatible with the measured parame-
ters available to the legitimate users: i.e., key rate Rraw
and the qber Q = Y1ε1. This is achieved by minimizing
Y1 in Eq. (7) by setting f0 = 0 and fn≥2 = 1. Therefore,
we can rewrite Eq. (7) for the protocol BB84 as
I
BB84
E
= 1− Y1[1− h(ε1)], (8)
where,
Y1 = 1− Y0 − Yn≥2 = 1− PsiftPA(n ≥ 2)/Rraw. (9)
The corresponding achievable secret key rate for the
protocol BB84 is
K
BB84
= Rraw{Y1[1− h(ε1)]− h(Q)}/2. (10)
Here we have taken Paccept = 1. It is true for the im-
plementation with polarization coding of the BB84 pro-
tocol. However, we can take the same value for the phase
encoding scheme as well [20].
Now, let us consider information eavesdropped on
qutrit protocol during collective attack. An attack
against qutrit protocol said to be successful only when
both Eve and Bob decode the qubit from the same sub-
space. On single photon qutrit pulse Eve decodes one of
the qubits with probability 2/3 and performs her mea-
surement. She then forwards a new qutrit to Bob that
encodes two new qubits in its subspaces. The quantum
state of the qubit in the subspace under attack corre-
sponding to Eve’s measurement result. On the other
hand, since Eve has no information on the state of the
qubit which was not under her attack, she prepares the
other qubit in random Pauli basis. On failure of decod-
ing, she sends a vacuum pulse to Bob. One may argue
that empty pulses reduce Bob’s overall detection rate but
it is not the case: since Eve can optimize the function
fn compatible with Bob’s detection rate. Therefore, the
probability that Eve and Bob decodes the qubit from the
same subspace becomes 1/2. For each successful decod-
ing, Eve gets IE,1 = h(ε1) bits of information. Here, as
mentioned earlier, ε1 is the error introduced by Eve. On
the other hand, if Bob decodes the qubit from the sub-
space which was not under attack, not only Eve gets zero
information but also she introduce an error with proba-
bility 1/2. Therefore, on average, Eve gets h(ε1)/2 bits
of information and creates (ε1 + 1/2)/2 bits of error.
There is another strategy at Eve’s disposal: send a
qubit to Bob corresponding to the decoded subspace
rather than a qutrit. This lowers Bob’s detection proba-
bility in the second subspace to 1/2 out of which half of
the detections contribute to errors. Bob attributes the
reduction in the detection probability to the channel loss
though, Eve compensates it by tuning the transfer func-
tion fn. On average, Eve gains 2h(ε1)/3 bits of informa-
tion at the expense of 2ε1/3+1/6 bits of error. It can be
seen that, this strategy gives comparatively higher infor-
mation gain to Eve at lower error probability. Therefore
the optimal attacking strategy for Eve on single photon
pulse is forward qubit rather than qutrit, to Bob.
PNS attack on multi-photon qutrit pulses is described
as follows. After the basis revelation by the users, Eve
projects the qutrit onto exactly the same subspace from
which Bob had decoded his qubit. This happens with
a probability 2/3 and she measures the decoded qubits
along the correct basis and gains full information. There-
fore, for two-photon pulses Eve gets 2/3 bit of informa-
tion, on contrary to one bit of information in PNS at-
tack against BB84 protocol. For three-photon pulses,
Eve gets 8/9 bit of information which can be approxi-
mated to 1 bit of information. Moreover, at very low
value of mean photon number the contribution of three-
photon pulses are negligible. By setting the values of
f0 = 0 and fn≥2 = 1 for maximizing her information and
the qber Q = Y1(2ε1/3 + 1/6), we can rewrite Eq. (7) for
the qutrit protocol as
Iqutrit
E
= 1− Y1[1− 2h(ε1)/3]− Y2/3, (11)
where, Y1 is same as that defined in Eq. (9) and
Y2 = PsiftPA(n = 2)/Rraw. (12)
Finally, the secure key rate of the qutrit protocol is
Kqutrit = Rraw{Y1[1−2h(ε1)/3]+Y2/3−h(Q)}/3, (13)
4FIG. 2: Key rate K vs transmission distance L. The figure
shows the comparison of Eq. (10) and Eq. (13) in terms of
transmission distance. The solid and dashed lines are for
qutrit and BB84 protocol, respectively. The parameters used
for this plot are: pd=10
−5,η=10%, Qopt=0.5%, Γb=0.5. The
qutrit protocol gives secure transmission distance of 69 km
compare to 52km of BB84 protocol.
with Paccept=2/3 as the probability of successful de-
coding of qubit from the qutrit.
The Fig. 2. shows the comparison of secure key rate
of BB84 and qutrit protocol in terms of transmission dis-
tance. The mean photon number µ is numerically opti-
mized and used in Eq. (10) and Eq. (13) for maximizing
the respective secure key rate for each transmission dis-
tance. It can be seen that, despite of imperfect qubit
decoding probability, the qutrit protocol gives same key
rate as BB84 at shorter distance. More importantly, it
gives comparatively higher key rate at longer distance,
which is the linchpin of the qutrit protocol. Under the
same experimental conditions, maximum secure trans-
mission distance of 69km is obtained for qutrit protocol
which is remarkably higher than 52 km of BB84 protocol.
In conclusion, we have presented a one-way protocol
based on qutrit for secure key distribution between two
legitimate users. The information encoded in the qubit
subspaces of the qutrit make the protocol highly tolerable
to photon number splitting attack; thanks to non-unity
qubit decoding probability. Additionally, it is more ro-
bust against attacks on single photon pulses. This is a
promising feature and may encourage an experimental
realization of the proposed protocol in the near future.
We thank L. Praxmeyer and M. Lucamarini for fruitful
discussions. This work is supported by European Com-
mission under the Integrating Project Q-ESSENCE.
[1] C. H.Bennett and G.Brassard, Proc.Int.Conf.Computer
systems and Signal Processing Bangalore,India, pages
175-179 (1984).
[2] P.W.Shor and J.Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett., 85, 441 (2000).
[3] N. Gisin, G.Ribordy, W.Tittel and H.Zbinden Rev. Mod.
Phys, 74, 145 (2002).
[4] V.Scarani, H.Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N.Cerf, M.Dusˇek,
N.Lu¨tkenhaus and M.Peev Rev. Mod. Phys, 81, 1301
(2009).
[5] E.Biham and T.Mor Phys. Rev. Lett., 78, 2256 (1997).
[6] N.Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A, 54, 97 (1996).
[7] V.Scarani, A.Ac´ın, G.Ribordy and N.Gisin Phys. Rev.
Lett., 92, 057901 (2004).
[8] W.Y.Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett., 91, 057901 (2003).
[9] K.Inoue, E.Waks, and Y.Yamamoto, Phys. Rev. Lett.,
89, 037902 (2002).
[10] N.Gisin, G.Ribordy, H.Zbinden, D.Stucki, N.Brunner
and V.Scarani, e-print arXiv:quant-ph/0411022, (2004).
[11] Y.Nambu, T.Hatanaka and K.Nakamura, Jpn. J. Appl.
Phys., 43, 1109 (2004).
[12] H.Bechmann-Pasquinucci and A.Peres, Phys. Rev. Lett.,
85, 15 (2000).
[13] S.Go¨blacher, T.Jennewein, A.Vaziri, G.Weihs, and
A.Zeilinger, New J. Phys., 8, 75 (2006).
[14] I.Bregman, D.Aharonov, M.Ben-Or, and H.S.Eisenberg,
Phys. Rev. A, 77, 050301 (2008).
[15] T.Durt, N.Cerf, N.Gisin, and Marek Z˙ukowski, Phys.
Rev. A, 67, 012311 (2003).
[16] G.Brassard, N.Lu¨tkenhaus, T.Mor and B.Sanders, Phys.
Rev. Lett., 85, 1330 (2000).
[17] N.Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A, 61, 052304 (2000).
[18] A.Grudka and A.Wojcik, Phys. Lett. A, 314, 350 (2003).
[19] L.Bart˚asˇkov, A.Cˇernoch, R.Filip, J.Fiurek, J.Soubusta,
and M.Dusˇek, Phys. Lett. A, 74, 022325 (2006).
[20] P. Townsend, Electron. Lett., 30, 809 (1994).
